الاثنين، 16 مارس 2015

Iran and its role in terrorism and the problems faced by internally and externally












Yemen Missing rabbit





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Chapter 3: State Sponsors of Terrorism Overview

IRAN SYRIA

IRAN

Designated as a State Sponsor of Terrorism in 1984, Iran continued its terrorist-related activity, including support for Palestinian terrorist groups in Gaza, and for Hizballah.  It has also increased its presence in Africa and attempted to smuggle arms to Houthi separatists in Yemen and Shia oppositionists in Bahrain.  Iran used the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF) and its regional proxy groups to implement foreign policy goals, provide cover for intelligence operations, and create instability in the Middle East.  The IRGC-QF is the regime’s primary mechanism for cultivating and supporting terrorists abroad.  

Iran views Syria as a crucial causeway in its weapons supply route to Hizballah, its primary beneficiary.  In 2013, Iran continued to provide arms, financing, training, and the facilitation of Iraqi Shia fighters to the Asad regime’s brutal crackdown, a crackdown that has resulted in the death of more than 100,000 civilians in Syria.  Iran has publicly admitted sending members of the IRGC to Syria in an advisory role.  There are reports indicating some of these troops are IRGC-QF members and that they have taken part in direct combat operations.  In February, senior IRGC-QF commander Brigadier General Hassan Shateri was killed in or near Zabadani, Syria.  This was the first publicly announced death of a senior Iranian military official in Syria.  In November, IRGC-QF commander Mohammad Jamalizadeh Paghaleh was also killed in Aleppo, Syria.  Subsequent Iranian media reports stated that Paghaleh was volunteering in Syria to defend the Sayyida Zainab mosque, which is located in Damascus.  The location of Paghaleh’s death, over 200 miles away from the mosque he was reported to be protecting, demonstrated Iran’s intent to mask the operations of IRGC-QF forces in Syria.  

Iran has historically provided weapons, training, and funding to Hamas and other Palestinian terrorist groups, including the Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), although Hamas’s ties to Tehran have been strained due to the Syrian civil war.  Since the end of the 2006 Israeli-Hizballah conflict, Iran has also assisted in rearming Hizballah, in direct violation of UNSCR 1701.  Iran has provided hundreds of millions of dollars in support of Hizballah in Lebanon and has trained thousands of its fighters at camps in Iran.  These trained fighters often use these skills in support of the Asad regime in Syria.

Despite its pledge to support Iraq’s stabilization, Iran trained, funded, and provided guidance to Iraqi Shia militant groups.  The IRGC-QF, in concert with Hizballah, provided training outside of Iraq as well as advisors inside Iraq for Shia militants in the construction and use of sophisticated improvised explosive device technology and other advanced weaponry.  Similar to Hizballah fighters, many of these trained Shia militants then use these skills to fight for the Asad regime in Syria, often at the behest of Iran.

On January 23, 2013, Yemeni authorities seized an Iranian dhow, the Jihan, off the coast of Yemen.  The dhow was carrying sophisticated Chinese antiaircraft missiles, C-4 explosives, rocket-propelled grenades, and a number of other weapons and explosives.  The shipment of lethal aid was likely headed to Houthi separatists in Northern Yemen.  Iran actively supports members of the Houthi movement, including activities intended to build military capabilities, which could pose a greater threat to security and stability in Yemen and the surrounding region.  

In late April 2013, the Government of Bosnia declared two Iranian diplomats, Jadidi Sohrab and Hamzeh Dolab Ahmad, persona non grata after Israeli intelligence reported they were members of Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security.  One of the two men had been spotted in India, Georgia, and Thailand, all of which were sites of a simultaneous bombing campaign in February 2012, according to Israeli intelligence.  Both diplomats were subsequently expelled from Bosnia.  

On December 29, 2013, the Bahraini Coast Guard interdicted a speedboat filled with weapons and explosives that was likely bound for Shia oppositionists in Bahrain, specifically the 14 February Youth Coalition (14 FYC).  Bahraini authorities accused the IRGC-QF of providing opposition militants with explosives training in order to carry out attacks in Bahrain.  The interdiction led to the discovery of two weapons and explosives cache sites in Bahrain, the dismantling of a car bomb, and the arrest of 15 Bahraini nationals.

Iran remained unwilling to bring to justice senior al-Qa’ida (AQ) members it continued to detain, and refused to publicly identify those senior members in its custody.  Iran allowed AQ facilitators Muhsin al-Fadhli and Adel Radi Saqr al-Wahabi al-Harbi to operate a core facilitation pipeline through Iran, enabling AQ to move funds and fighters to South Asia and also to Syria.  Al-Fadhli is a veteran AQ operative who has been active for years.  Al-Fadhli began working with the Iran-based AQ facilitation network in 2009 and was later arrested by Iranian authorities.  He was released in 2011 and assumed leadership of the Iran-based AQ facilitation network.  

Iran remains a state of proliferation concern.  Despite multiple UNSCRs requiring Iran to suspend its sensitive nuclear proliferation activities, Iran continued to violate its international obligations regarding its nuclear program.  For further information, see the Report to Congress on Iran-related Multilateral Sanctions Regime Efforts (November 2013), and the Report on the Status of Bilateral and Multilateral Efforts Aimed at Curtailing the Pursuit of Iran of Nuclear Weapons Technology (September 2012).  

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SYRIA

Designated in 1979 as a State Sponsor of Terrorism, the Asad regime continued its political support to a variety of terrorist groups affecting the stability of the region and beyond, even amid significant internal unrest.  The regime continued to provide political and weapons support to Hizballah and continued to allow Iran to rearm the terrorist organization.  The Asad regime’s relationship with Hizballah and Iran continued to grow stronger in 2013 as the conflict in Syria continued.  President Bashar al-Asad remained a staunch defender of Iran's policies, while Iran has exhibited equally energetic support for Syrian regime efforts to defeat the Syrian opposition.  Statements supporting terrorist groups, particularly Hizballah, were often in Syrian government speeches and press statements.

The Syrian government had an important role in the growth of terrorist networks in Syria through the permissive attitude the Asad regime took towards al-Qa’ida’s foreign fighter facilitation efforts during the Iraq conflict.  Syrian government awareness and encouragement for many years of violent extremists’ transit through Syria to enter Iraq, for the purpose of fighting Coalition Troops, is well documented.  Syria was a key hub for foreign fighters en route to Iraq.  Those very networks were the seedbed for the violent extremist elements that terrorized the Syrian population in 2013.  

As part of a broader strategy during the year, the regime has attempted to portray Syria itself as a victim of terrorism, characterizing all of its armed opponents as “terrorists.”

Asad’s government has continued to generate significant concern regarding the role it plays in terrorist financing.  Industry experts reported that 60 percent of all business transactions were conducted in cash and that nearly 80 percent of all Syrians did not use formal banking services.  Despite Syrian legislation that required money changers to be licensed by the end of 2007, many continued to operate illegally in Syria's vast black market, estimated to be as large as Syria's formal economy.  Regional hawala networks remained intertwined with smuggling and trade-based money laundering, and were facilitated by notoriously corrupt customs and immigration officials.  This raised significant concerns that some members of the Syrian government and the business elite were complicit in terrorist finance schemes conducted through these institutions.

In 2013, the United States continued to closely monitor Syria’s proliferation-sensitive materials and facilities, including Syria’s significant stockpile of chemical weapons, which the United States assesses remains under the Asad regime’s control.  Despite the progress made through the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapon’s Executive Council and UNSC Resolution 2118 (2013) to dismantle and destroy Syria’s chemical weapons program, there continues to be significant concern, given ongoing instability in Syria, that these materials could find their way to terrorist organizations.  The United States is coordinating closely with a number of like-minded nations and partners to prevent Syria’s stockpiles of chemical and advanced conventional weapons from falling into the hands of violent extremists.  

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IRAN



WHAT ROUHANI SAYS
WHAT ROUHANI DOES



HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN IRAN & IRAQ


 List of terror crimes committed by Iran 


 Iran’s new Defense minister: Hezbollah chief who planned 1983 Marine barracks attack 


 Iran has established terrorist networks throughout Latin America


 Iran safe heaven for  Al Qaeda    


 Iran support  Al Qaeda 


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A prolongation of the talks as allowing Iran to play for time. 




Taqiyya and lies and Hate in Shia religion



John Kerry – has a son-in-law from Iran could affect how Kerry deals with the Iranians.



Get Tough with Tehran  
 Michael Doran 


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5 Nationalist organizations in Iran is seeking to break away from Iran





Azerbaijan, Iran

Turkmen desert

Spaces

Kurds

Baloch


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South Azerbaijan
Azeri national liberation movement
Separatist and union with the Republic of Azerbaijan
Hamedan Caspian regions Karaj and all areas where the mixing of ethnic Azeri West Azerbaijan

أكثر من 5 منظمات قومية في ايران تسعي الي الانفصال عن ايران
5 منظمات قومية في ايران تسعي الي الانفصال عن ايران


اذربيجان ايران
صحراء التركمان
الاحواز
الاكراد
البلوش

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اذربيجان الجنوبية
حركة تحرير الوطنية الاذرية
انفصالية و الاتحاد مع جمهورية اذربيجان
المناطق همدان قزوين كرج وكل المناطق التي فيها اختلاط عرقي اذري غرب اذربيجان

Azerbaijan (Iran)

Proposed state: SouthAzerbaijanFlag.gif South Azerbaijan
Political party: CAMAH (South Azerbaijan National Liberation Movement), a Baku-based separatist organisation that advocates for the separation of Iranian Azerbaijan from Iran and unification with the Republic of Azerbaijan. According to them, the predominantly ethnic Persian provinces of Hamadan, Qazvin and Karaj and the whole of the ethnically mixed province of West Azerbaijan are parts of Azerbaijan.[15]

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منظمة تحرير تركمان الصحراء
جنوب تركمنستان
حزب كل الاتراك
Turkmen Sahra

Proposed state: South Turkmenistan

Political party: Turkmen-Sahra Liberation Organization
Pan-Turkism party

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الاحواز

عرب الاحواز
الجبهة الديمقراطية
حزب النهضة
منظمة تحرير الاحواز
حزب التضامن الاحواز الديمقراطي

Arabs of Khūzestān

Proposed state: Flag of Arabistan.svg al-Ahwaz[16]
Further information: Politics of Khūzestān Province
Militant organisations: Al-Ahwaz Arab People's Democratic Popular Front, Ahwaz Arab Renaissance Party, Ahwaz Liberation Organisation
Advocacy group: Democratic Solidarity Party of Al-Ahwaz (member of the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization)

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الاكراد
الحزب الكردي الديمقراطي
حزب الحرية الكردي

Kurdish people

Proposed state: Flag of Kurdistan.svg Kurdistan[17]
Political parties: Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (member of the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization)
Militant organisations: Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan, Komalah

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البلوش وسيستان
منظمة جند الله

Sistan and Baluchestan Province

Proposed state: Balochistan
Political party: Balochistan People's Party
Militant organisations: Jundallah (Iran)

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Affiliates
? Organisation of Kurmanj People
? Kurdistan Freedom Party
? Balochistan People's Front
? Balochistan United Front Federal Republican
? Baluchistan National Movement - Iran
? Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan
? Party of United Lurestan and Bakhtiari
? Balochistan Peoples Party
? Democratic Solidarity Party of al-Ahwaz
? National Movement of Iranian Turkmenistan
? Southern Azerbaijan National Awakening Movement
? Turkmen National Democratic Movement
? Organization for Defence of the Rights of Turkmen People
? Komela Party of Iranian Kurdistan
? Federal-Democratic Movement of Azerbaijan
? Azerbaijan Diplomatic Mission

موقع ايران الفيدرالية

http://iranfederal.org/en/



معلومات عن تركمنستان الجنوبية


This page is part of © FOTW Flags Of The World website
Southern Turkmenistan (Iran)

Güney Türkmenistan,Turkmenlik, Turkmensahra Liberation Organization,turkmen,

Last modified: 2008-10-18 by ian macdonald
Keywords: southern turkmenistan |
Links: FOTW homepage | search | disclaimer and copyright | write us | mirrors


[Southern Turkmenistan] image located by Chrystian Kretowicz, 3 August 2008

Source: http://www.gamoh.biz/habergoster.asp?id=210

De*****ion of the flag
Turkmensahra Liberation Organization
Türkmenlik-National Democratic Movement of Turkmenia
See also:

Iran
Iran: Index of All Pages
De********ion of the flag

In 1881, the Treaty of Alkhal divided the Turkmen territories between Russia, Persia and Afghanistan. The Turkmen in present-day Iran number about 1,100,000 and live in what is called Turkmensahra or Southern Turkmenistan, in and around Gondbad Kavus (center of Turkmensahra), Bandar Turkmen, Aq-Qala and Gomishan, all, roughly, along the Iran-Turkmenistan border from the Caspian Sea up to the town of Sarakhs, from below the sea level to the mountain peaks of more than 3,000 m high.
The main tribes of the Iranian Turkmen are Yomut Tribe (subdivided into Jafarbay, Atabay and Agh-Atabay), Nokhorli Tribe, Goklen Tribe, Teke Tribe.
Most of Iranian Turkmen are Sunnis of the Hanafi branch, but some follow the Naqshbandieh Sufism. They have also a history of the opposition to the central governments.

The flag of Southern Turkmenistan is horizontal yellow - red - green with the blue trapezoid at the hoist. There is a variant of that flag with the addition of the crescent and the star. The disparity of the shades of colors was never explained on the websites known to me. I don't think it has any significance, just lack of regulations.
Chrystian Kretowicz, 3 August 2008

Variant

[Southern Turkmenistan] image located by Chrystian Kretowicz, 3 August 2008

Source: http://www.gamoh.biz/habergoster.asp?id=210

Turkmensahra Liberation Organization

[Turkmensahra Liberation Organization] image located by Chrystian Kretowicz, 3 August 2008

One of the most prominent Turkmen organizations fighting for Turkmens' rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran is Turkmensahra Liberation Organization. The flag is an Iranian tricolor with a red crescent and five stars on the white stripe.
Chrystian Kretowicz, 3 August 2008

Türkmenlik - National Democratic Movement of Turkmenia

[National Democratic Movement of Turkmenia] image located by Chrystian Kretowicz, 3 August 2008

One of the most prominent Turkmen organizations fighting for Turkmens' rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran is the National Democratic Movement of Turkmenia . The flag is green with a white crescent and star and two red stripes near the hoist.
Chrystian Kretowicz, 3 August 2008

http://www.crwflags.com/fotw/flags/ir_sturk.html


Statements From Turkmensahra Liberation Organization



Iran weak state economically and ethnically fragmented and ideologically and religiously

http://aljazeeraalarabiamodwana.blogspot.com/2015/03/iran-weak-state-economically-and.html

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Iran now suffers from many problems, no matter how she tried to show the country that wants to play a role


Iran now suffers from many problems, no matter how she tried to show the country that wants to play a role, but reality tells us Iran threatened with state-of-home and abroad. If there was a plan to destroy destroy weapons that you use against others they give rise to discord through
Shiites in the Gulf, Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen and to learn she was going to die with weapons that you use against others as a singer died in the same way that he used against other religious and nationalist demographic constitute a weak point for Iran Iran has border problems with all the surrounding states
1.hidden Problem with Russia because of thevorder  of the division of the Caspian Sea
2. Gulf state and interference in the internal Affairs is welcomed in Bahrain, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia and the Emirates and the occupation of UAE islands
3. Iraq and the border  of the Shatt al-Arab and intervention in Iraq
4-Afghanistan and the old problems and new
5. The composition of the national and religious opposition in Iran and the MEK and Baluchis and Kurds and Azeris and Arabstan
This, for example, and not as a limitation in addition to economic weakness and strength is the basis of each country there is a war without money and arms




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سلطة الولي الفقيه

Authority of Wali-Faqih and the Religious Precepts (Primary and Secondary Judgments) 

There is no doubt that every Muslim should follow the primary and secondary religious rules. These rules are the external form of the commitment to the religion that determine the religious oughts and ought nots. On the other hand, establishing a state in a particular period of time, requires different methods and expertise. Thus, a religious ruler apart from dealing with religious rules, should tackle the state rules as well. In certain cases a state rule is meant to execute the primary rules or secondary rules, distinguish their subjects or take care of certain religious issues. Here a jurisconsult can use his authority. But in certain cases the primary or secondary laws deal with lawful or unlawful matters, like the obligatory of Hajj pilgrimage and unlawfulness of usury and so on. The question is that whether a wali-e faqih can pass a decree against such rules for the interest of the Muslims and prevent their execution? 

In his argument, Imam Khumayni held that the governmental authority of a wali-e faqih and infallible Imams (a) is identical. Only in certain cases infallible Imams enjoy particular authority which has nothing to do with their guardianship over society like the case of early jihad which is probably related to only infaliable Imams (a).[95] In his book, he did not refer to the governmental jurisdiction of the infaliable Imams (a) and only he has cited some examples as: 

The Prophet (s) used lashing as a punishment measure for hundred times. Similarly the Imams (a) and a wali-e faqih can practice this punishment. They collect charities in a similar way and use them for the benefit of the people and it is for people to obey them.[96] 

Of course there is a reference to absolute and general guardianships[97] in his book al-Bay`(book of sale). But there is no explicit explanation of the relations between the authority of a wali-e faqih and the primary and secondary rules. 

In a letter to the then labor minister, Imam Khumayni clarified the jurisdiction of a faqih concerning religious precepts and the authority of the government in laying necessary conditions for the contractors. 

Following such a statement, a discussion started among high ranking officials. Then the Imam in a letter wrote: 

"It is said that I held that government has authority but within the framework of Divine rule. Such assertion is against my ideas. If the authority of state is within the Divine derivative commandments, then, divine rule and absolute guardianship of the Prophet (s) should be meaningless ... State is a branch of the Prophet's absolute guardianship. It is one of the primary rules of Islam and is prior to all derivative commandments, like prayer, fasting and Hajj pilgrimage ... State can stop any issue whether ritualistic or non-ritualistic if it is against the interest of Islam."[98] 

This statement suggest that the authority of a wali faqih is unlimited to the extent that he can temporarily suspend the primary and secondary rules if he realizes that it is in the interest of the Muslims. While elaborating on the authority of wali-e faqih, in his book al-Ba`y, Imam Khumayni stresses that the authority of wali-e faqih is unlimited. Indeed Imam's latest explanation on the jurisdiction of wali-e faqih as already explained in the said book. 

In Imam Khumayni's views, governmental rules are not secondary rules but are primary rules.[99] Therefore, guardianship over governmental rules does not depend on necessity, emergency cases, etc., but on the interests of Muslims.[100] 

However, Imam Khumayni did not forward any particular formula for ascertaining the interest of Muslims, but in his political career he considered the Expert Assembly as an authority for identifying this interest. He used to consult experts but he was the man to pass the final decree. 

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Authority of Wali Faqih and the Law 

Civil laws are of two kinds: constitutional and conventional laws. Constitutional laws are superior to conventional laws. If we elaborate on the relations between authority of wali-e faqih and constitutional law, relations between wali-e faqih and the conventional laws will be also cleared. 

In the Constitution (of the Islamic Republic of Iran) the authority of the wali-e faqih is limited (Article 110). Before the amendment of the constitution, the term absolute guardianship was not mentioned anywhere in the Constitution. But in Imam's views, constitution is not higher than religious rules. As wali faqih has an authority over the derivative rules, he has the same authority over the constitution. Of course, in an Islamic society constitution is based on Islamic rules. The Fuqaha, particularly Imam Khumayni, have approved the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran as compatible with Islamic teachings. 

During his ten years of the leadership of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Imam Khumayni in certain cases did not abide by the Constitution. For instance, he ordered the formation of a Special Court for the trial of the clerics and also set up the Expediency Council. It is quite clear in these cases that wali-e faqih's jurisdiction overlaps that of the constitution.

When that Expediency Council violated constitutional laws, a group of Majlis representatives wrote a letter to Imam Khumayni and protested the council's decisions. In response, Imam said:

"What you have written is correct. I hope an atmosphere would be created in which everyone would act according to the constitution. What has happened during the past few year, has been related to emergency of war time. The interests of Islam and the system demanded that we settle the problems quickly."[101] 

The reason behind the violation of the constitution is that Imam Khumayni considered governmental rules higher than the primary and secondary religious rules. Even in his letter, Imam Khumayni says that he intends to do so and so, he does not talk about the necessity of abiding by the constitution. We can infer from his practical life and speeches that at the time of an emergency he considers governmental rules higher than the constitution. But normally, violation of the constitutional laws is not permissible. What are the criteria for identifying the interests of the Muslims? What is an emergency situation? These are the questions that were never attended by Imam Khumayni. 

Of course, the aforementioned authority of the wali-e faqih is valid when the wali-e faqih is appointed by an infallible Imams (a). If the wali-e faqih is elected by people, i.e., his legitimacy is drawn from the people's vote his authority will not be probably as much as the one appointed by an infallible Imam. His authority in this case will be determined on the basis of the people's allegiance to him.

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95. Kitab al-Bay`, op. Cite., vol. 2, p. 496. 

96. Ibid., vol. 2, p. 467. 

97. Ibid., vol. 2, p. 

98. Sahifa-Nur, op. Cite., vol. 20, pp. 170-171. 

99. Ibid., vol. 10, p. 138. 

100. Ayatullah Makarim Shirazi, Anwar al-Fiqaha, Kitab al-Bay`, part one, p. 550. 

101. Sahifa-Nur, op. Cite., vol. 21, p. 57.

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ولاية الفقيه و صناعة الطاغوت الصنم

http://aljazeeraalarabiamodwana.blogspot.com/2015/02/blog-post_12.html

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IRAQ


 the former commander of U.S. forces in Iraq for Iran's role in Iraq and sabotage the whole region 




Men Leading attack to invade  Tikrit  accused of bombing the US & French embassies  in 1983



Hillary Clinton: 'Failure' to Help Syrian Rebels Led to the Rise of ISIS




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iraq suffer from 2 problem the sectarian oppression of  Nouri  Almaliki  against the sunnis and legitimate demand of sunni 1
to have them right as iraqi citizen by using isis as Scarecrow to cover the core problem  which is the rights of the sunni 2
and  by sending  sending up to 300 military advisers to Iraq america is  supporting the crimes of   Nouri  Almaliki 3
 i refer to Joe Biden's 2006 argument for partitioning Iraq is the solution 4


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Iraqi shiite government forces torturing Iraqi Sunni till death  terrifying content 


Iraqi Shiite government forces kill Sunni boy


February 2015 Iran’s strategy for regional supremacy has facilitated the rise of ISIS



Why we stuck with Maliki — and lost Iraq 


Iraq death squads target Sunni victims by name 



Iraq : Shia militias 'abducting and killing Sunni civilians in revenge for Isis attacks'


Shia Death Squads in Iraq where Sunni Muslims still are Hunted, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zRzUpnTejLc


  Maliki Manipulating Iraqi Elections



 Iraq - Genocide in Fallujah 



 How can the U.S. help Maliki when Maliki’s the problem? 




Iran and shia plan
to move basically the Sunni and the Christians out of parts of Baghdad


http://www.ncr-iran.org/en/news/terrorism-fundamentalism/16486-gen-george-casey-iranian-regime-continues-fomenting-violence-in-iraq



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