Hizballah Cavalcade: Roundup of Iraqis Killed in Syria, Part 1
NOTE: For prior parts in the Hizballah Cavalcade series you can view an archive of it all here.
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By Phillip Smyth
Reports of Iraqi Shia involvement in the Syrian Civil War surged from January-May, 2013.[1] In March, the first photos and bios of Iraqi Shia killed during the fighting were released. Many of these announcements, photos of those killed, and other information received much broader coverage after it was spread on forums and Facebook pages. Thus far, the only two Iraqi groups to have announced they have lost members have been Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (League of the Righteous) and Kata’ib Hizballah (Hizballah Brigades).
It should be mentioned that Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq has not announced on its official webpage that it has had any “Martyrs” in recent months. Nevertheless, the group has set-up funeral processions for its dead in major Iraqi cities. In sharp contrast to Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq’s lacking web announcements; Kata’ib Hizballah updates its webpage regularly and in a more detailed fashion, regarding the fate of its members who have been killed and their funerals. Both Kata’ib Hizballah and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, like their Lebanese counterpart, Hizballah, do not mention where these fighters were killed. Regardless, on most forums and Facebook pages, those who post comments are generally aware that the two groups are actively involved in fighting in Syria.
Created during the height of Coalition operations during the Iraq War, together, Kata’ib Hizballah and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq have received extensive assistance from Lebanese Hizballah and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corp.[2] Both Iraqi groups are also major supporters of Iranian Revolutionary Islamist ideology (Wilayat al-Faqih).[3] Thus, it is extremely likely both organizations are acting as proxy forces for Iran.
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Name: Sa’ad Abed al-Qadr Abu Shamia’
Affiliated With: Kata’ib Hizballah
Death Announced: March 17, 2013
Name: Ahmed Mahdi al-Shuweili (A.K.A. Qassim Abu Mahdi)
Affiliated With: Kata’ib Hizballah
Death Announced: March 15, 2013
Name: Arfad Muhsein Al-Hamidawi (A.K.A. Abu Karar)
Affiliated With: Kata’ib Hizballah
Death Announced: April 2, 2013
Name: Karar Abed al-Amir Fatlawi Abu Assad (A.K.A. Karar Fatlawi and Karar Abed al-Amir Aziz Abu Assad)
Affiliated With: Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq and Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas
Death Announced: Early April, 2013.
Note: Karar has one of the best developed narratives of any of the Iraqis killed. His story comes complete with numerous photos, a Facebook page, and supposed videos of him engaged in fighting. It is also important to note that he is the only one to have significant acceptance from supporters that he was a part of both Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq and the Syria-based (members mainly come from Iraq and Lebanon) Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas.
Karar Abed al-Amir Fatlawi Abu Assad’s Funeral-Part 1
Karar Abed al-Amir Fatlawi Abu Assad’s Funeral-Part 2
Name: Ahmed Farhud Hashim al-Zerjawi (A.K.A. Ahmed Farhud Hashim)
Affiliated With: Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq
Death Announced: May 2, 2013 (for funeral held in Najaf, Iraq)
Note: Iran’s Supreme Leader Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is pictured on the left and Iraqi cleric Grand Ayatollah Muhammed Sadiq al-Sadr is pictured on the right.
Name: Yahiya Sarmad Muhammed al-Fayli (A.K.A. Yahiya al-Fayli and Asu)
Affiliated With: Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq
Death Announced: Early May, 2013 (most forums list between May, 5-May,7)
Note: Iran’s Supreme Leader Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is pictured on the right and Iraqi cleric Grand Ayatollah Muhammed Sadiq al-Sadr is pictured on the left.
[1] One example: Mariam Karouny, “Shi’ite fighters rally to defend Damascus shrine”, Reuters, March 3, 2013,http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/03/us-syria-crisis-shiites-idUSBRE92202X20130303.
[2] Elizabeth O’Bagy and Stephen Wicken , “Fact Sheet: Ali Musa Daqduq”, Institute For the Study of War, May 14, 2012,http://www.understandingwar.org/reference/fact-sheet-ali-mussa-daqduq. See also: Thomas Strouse, “Kata’ib Hezbollah and the Intricate Web of Iranian Military Involvement in Iraq”, Jamestown Foundation, Terrorism Monitor Volume: 8 Issue: 9, March 4, 2010, http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=36109.
[3] [Absolute] Wilayat al-Faqih (also known by in Persian as “Velayat-e-Faqih) is an ideological concept first drawn up by Iran’s late Supreme Leader, Grand Ayatollah Khomeini. Khomeini posited that only learned clerics could rule over society and make political decisions. This was an extremely radical departure from the more traditional schools of Shi’ism. As a result, those currently following this ideology are religiously bound to follow the rulings of the Wali al-Faqih, who is currently Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei. See also: Sam Wyer, The Resurgence of Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, Institute for the Study of War, Middle East Security Report 7,December, 2012, http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/ResurgenceofAAH.pdf.
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المقاتلون الأجانب الآخرون في سوريا
عن الكتائب والألوية الشيعية المقاتلة في سوريا
e Foreign Policy Essay: “Syria’s Other Foreign Fighters”
The Syria conflict hasn’t really stayed in Syria. The trickle of Sunni jihadists traveling to Syria to fight quickly became a flood, with their numbers rapidly surpassing those in past wars, the anti-Soviet struggle in Afghanistan being just one. Because of their strong anti-Western views and tendency toward international terrorist activities, the Sunni fighters have become an obsession of intelligence officials in Western capitals – including here in the United States. However, another consequential flow of foreign fighters has received far less attention: the thousands of Shi’ite fighters entering Syria, primarily from Lebanon and Iraq.
The number of Shi’ite fighters may meet or even exceed that of their Sunni jihadist enemies. Aaron Zelin, a fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, estimates that the total number of foreign Shi’ite fighters in Syria (as of December 2013) may be as high as 10,000. According to Zelin, Lebanon’s Hizballah has dispatched from 3,000 to 5,000 total fighters, many of whom rotate on a monthly basis (and thus the number at a moment in time is lower). Iraqi Shi’ite fighters, conclude Zelin, total somewhere between 3,500 and 4,000. As for who comprises these groups and their affiliations, Zelin explains:
[T]he Lebanese are fighting with Hezbollah. The Iraqi scene is a bit more complicated. Iraqi groups like the Hezbollah Battalions, Asaib Ahl al-Haq, and the Badr Organization are funneling fighters to Syria but use different front groups. The most prominent among these newly formed groups is the Abu-Fadl al-Abbas Brigade. Others include the Sayyid al-Shuhada Battalions, the Zulfiqar Brigade, the Ammar ibn Yasser Brigade (associated with the Hezbollah Battalions and Asaib Ahl al-Haq), the Imam al-Hasan al-Mujtaba Brigade, the Martyr Mohamed Baqir al-Sadr Forces (associated with the Badr Organization), and the Khorasani Vanguard Company.
The Shi’ite influx swelled after the Sunnis began to flock in, and in many ways was a response to the Sunnis’ entrance. Both the Shi’ite-led Iraqi government and Hizballah had their own reasons for downplaying their support of the Asad regime and initially kept their actions clandestine. In the case of the Iraqi fighters, substate groups, not the government itself, send them. The Lebanese Hizballah initially kept quiet about its support, but as the violence increased and its role expanded, Hizballah openly declared its backing.
The motivations of many Shi’ite foreign fighters mirror those of their Sunni enemies. As the conflict’s atrocities have grown, and as the struggle became more defined as one of Sunnis seeking to defeat the apostate regime in Damascus, the Shi’a began to rally around Asad and his government. Although the dominant ‘Alawis in Syria differ in several important doctrinal aspects from more mainstream Shi’a, their enemies often lump these two groups together. The Sunnis view the anti-Alawi struggle as paralleling the Shi’ite-Sunni fighting and tension in Iraq and Lebanon; this perception has resulted in a self-fulfilling prophecy, one in which supposed religious self-defense mobilizes the opposing parties. So, Shi’ite groups emphasize emotive issues such as the defense of the shrine of Sayyida Zeinab, a Shi’ite shrine south of Damascus in their propaganda.
Sunnis receive indirect encouragement from some regional governments, which seek to topple the Asad regime and view the struggle as a proxy for a broader conflict with Iran. Tehran is encouraging, albeit more quietly, foreign Shi’a to join the fight. Iran, of course, wants to ensure that its oldest Arab ally remains in power. The IRGC reportedly provides training to many Shi’a before they join the fray and is also sending its own fighters.
The Lebanese Hizballah, Iran’s close ally, also wants the Asad regime to remain in power for its own reasons. Hizballah has long worked closely with the Syrian regime and, after the 2005 protests that forced Syria to withdraw its military forces from Lebanon, it has represented Asad’s interests in Lebanon. Given Syria’s historic influence over Hizballah’s home turf, the toppling of Asad or a government that brought oppositionists into power, even in a limited way, would be bad news for Hizballah.
The Shi’ite influx is also more organized than the Sunni effort. Because it draws on established groups like Lebanon’s Hizballah and Asaib Ahl al-Haq in Iraq, Shi’a fighters are more systematically recruited and deployed. Greater centralization and command and control of pro-regime forces – perhaps Bashar’s greatest asset against the opposition, which has hundreds or even thousands of disparate factions that often do not cooperate and occasionally fight one another – enables the integration of foreign forces more effectively into the existing military structure.
Most important, many of the Shi’a traveling to Syria are excellent fighters. Although some Sunnis come from established jihadist groups such as Al Qaeda in Iraq, most do not. Many Sunnis who travel to fight are inspired by the horrors of the war and strong anti-Shi’ite sentiment, but they are inexperienced. They make fine suicide bombers, but are less useful on the battlefield. The Shi’a hailing from Iraq, in contrast, often earned their spurs in the brutal sectarian conflict there during the Iraqi civil war, which ended in a triumph for the Shi’ite militias. The Lebanese Shi’a are even more formidable. Hizballah is perhaps the most militarily accomplished substate group in the world. Its forces have repeatedly scored tactical victories against the Israeli military–no easy task. Hundreds of Hizballah fighters helped the Asad regime regain control of Qusair, a battle viewed often as a turning point in the war, or at least the moment the Asad regime regained footing after suffering a series of defeats.
Sadly, and frighteningly, conflict involving Shi’ite fighters are likely to spread beyond Syria. Already, violence in Iraq and Lebanon has surged. More and more, the borders of this conflict do not align with state boundaries. We should expect Shi’ite fighters with experience in Syria to continue to play a violent role when they return home.
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